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契約理論在無(wú)線(xiàn)協(xié)作通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的應(yīng)用

契約理論在無(wú)線(xiàn)協(xié)作通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的應(yīng)用

作者：趙楠著
出版社：中國(guó)水利水電出版社出版時(shí)間：2018-05-01
開(kāi)本： 24cm 頁(yè)數(shù)： 185頁(yè)
中 圖 價(jià):¥39.9(5.7折) 定價(jià)  ¥70.0 登錄后可看到會(huì)員價(jià)
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契約理論在無(wú)線(xiàn)協(xié)作通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的應(yīng)用 版權(quán)信息

  • ISBN：9787517061731
  • 條形碼：9787517061731 ; 978-7-5170-6173-1
  • 裝幀：一般膠版紙
  • 冊(cè)數(shù)：暫無(wú)
  • 重量：暫無(wú)
  • 所屬分類(lèi)：>

契約理論在無(wú)線(xiàn)協(xié)作通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的應(yīng)用 內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介

本書(shū)從純粹的數(shù)學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度, 針對(duì)不同的無(wú)線(xiàn)協(xié)作通信場(chǎng)景, 著重圍繞系統(tǒng)模型、*優(yōu)契約設(shè)計(jì)和協(xié)作激勵(lì)策略等方面, 通過(guò)建立包括逆向選擇模型、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型、混合激勵(lì)模型、動(dòng)態(tài)契約模型等多個(gè)契約模型, 詳細(xì)闡述契約的理論在無(wú)線(xiàn)協(xié)作通信和網(wǎng)絡(luò)應(yīng)用中所涉及到的建模和契約優(yōu)化的細(xì)節(jié)。

契約理論在無(wú)線(xiàn)協(xié)作通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的應(yīng)用 目錄

Chapter 1 Introduction
1．1 Wireless Cooperative Networks
1．2 Book Scope and Contributions．．
1．3 Book Organization

Chapter 2 Contract Theory
2．1 Basic Contract Concepts
2．2 Adverse Selection
2．3 Moral Hazard
2．4 Summary

Chapter 3 Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks under Asymmetric Information
3．1 Introduction
3．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
3．2．1 Source Modeling
3．2．2 Relay Node Modeling
3．2．3 Contract Formulation
3．3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information
3．4 Optimal Contract Design Under Asymmetric Information
3．4．1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
3．4．2 Optimal Contract Design
3．5 Results and Discussion
3．5．1 Symmetric Information Scenario
3．5．2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
3．5．3 Symmetric Information and Asymmetric Information Scenarios
3．6 Summary

Chapter 4 A Contract-Based Model For Multiuser Cooperative Relay In Wireless Communication Networks
4．1 Introduction
4．2 System Model
4．2．1 Source Modeling
4．2．2 Relay Node Modeling
4．2．3 Contract Formulation
4．3 Optimal Contract Design with Single Source
4．3． 1 Problem Formulation
4．3．2 Iterative Algorithm
4．4 Optimal Contract Design with Multiple Sources
4．4．1 Problem Formulation
4．4．2 Iterative Algorithm
4．5 Results and Discussions
4．5．1 Single Source's Relay incentive
4．5．2 Multiple Sources' Relay incentive
4．5．3 Convergence Analysis of Iterative Algorithm
4．6 RNs' Power Constraint Effect
4．7 Summary

Chapter 5 Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Moral Hazard
5．l Introduction
5．2 System Model
5．2．1 Source Modelling
5．2．2 Relay Node Modelling
5．2．3 Contract Formulation
5．3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
5．4 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
5．5 Results and Discussions
5．5．1 Symmetric Information Scenario
5．5．2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
5．6 Summary

Chapter 6 Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks
6．1 Introduction
6．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
6．2．1 Utility of Mobile Users
6．2．2 Utility of Service Provider
6．2．3 Contract Formulation
6．3 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
6．4 Analysis and Discussion
6．5 Numerical Results
6．6 Summary

Chapter 7 Contract Design for Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Dual Asymmetric Information In Cooperative Networks
7．1 Introduction
7．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
7．2．1 Source Modelingz
7．2．2 Relay Node Modeling
7．2．3 Contract Formulation
7．3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
7．4 Optimal Contract Design under Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．5 Optimal Contract Design under Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．5．1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
7．5．2 Optimal Contract Design
7．6 Results and Discussions
7．6．1 Symmetric Information Scenario
7．6．2 Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．6．3 Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．7 Optimal contract design with the RNs' continuous types
7．8 Summary

Chapter 8 Monitoring Strategy for Relay Incentive Mechanism in Cooperative Communications Networks
8．1 Introduction
8．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
8．2．1 Relay Nodes Modeling
8．2．2 Source Node Modeling with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8．2．3 Source Node Modeling with Monitoring Strategy
8．2．4 Contract Formulation
8．3 Optimal Contract Design with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8．4 Optimal Contract Design with Information-Monitoring Strategy
8．4．1 Stage III： RNs' behaviors
8．4．2 Stage II： MN's decision
8．4．3 Stage I： Source's decision
8．5 Optimal Contract Design with Action-Monitoring Strategy
8．5．1 Stage II： MN's Decision
8．5．2 Stage I： Source's Decision
8．6 Results and Discussions
8．7 Impact of RNs' Relay Effort Constraint
8．8 Summary

Chapter 9 Dynamic Contract Design for Cooperative Wireless Networks
9．1 Introduction
9．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
9．2．1 Relay Node Model
9．2．2 Source Model
9．2．3 Contract Formulation
9．3 Dynamic Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
9．3．1 Contracting Design in Period 2
9．3．2 Contracting Design in Period 1
9．3．3 Optimal Contract Design
9．4 Simulation Results and Discussion
9．5 Summary

Chapter 10 Conclusion and Future Works
10．1 Conclusion
10．2 Future works
References
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